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Abstract
Despite an implied right to habitat protection to sustain tribal fisheries,
and a more explicit requirement for habitat protection under the Endangered
Species Act, in both instances ambiguities remain in the interpretation of its
definition and scope. In addition, despite many favorable court rulings,
both tribes and environmental groups have generally been unable to achieve
the common goal of actual in-stream water flows required to sustain healthy
aquatic habitat and fish populations. This paper details the legal decisions
addressing tribal rights to habitat protection and the requirement for habitat
protection under the Endangered Species Act, delineates the scope of these
obligations and discusses existing ambiguities, constraints, and complemen-
tarities. It briefly examines several cases where alliances between tribes
and environmental groups created stronger opportunities to enhance the
protection of aquatic habitat, and discusses areas of common ground that
could provide the basis for stronger coalitions between these groups.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Healthy fisheries are essential for many American Indian tribes whose
fishing lifestyle is central to their existence, culture and welfare.1 In the
foundational 1905 case United States v. Winans,2 the court made it clear
that when tribes ceded their aboriginal lands in treaties they did not grant
away their fishing rights.3 However, no court has ruled explicitly whether
this fishing right includes a right to habitat protection, although multiple
decisions have implied such a right.4  Similarly, the American public has
deemed the conservation of species and the protection of their habitat as an
important societal goal. This was made manifest under the Endangered
Species Act (ESA) where Congress declared that one purpose of the act was
"to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered spe-
cies and threatened species depend may be conserved.",5 Both sections 76
and 97 of the ESA include requirements to protect habitat for threatened and
endangered species. Despite an implied right to habitat protection to sus-
tain tribal fisheries, and a more explicit requirement for habitat protection
under ESA, in both instances ambiguities remain in the interpretation of its
definition and scope. More important, despite many favorable court rul-
ings, both tribes and environmental groups have generally been unable to
achieve the actual in-stream water flows required to sustain healthy aquatic
1. U.S. v. Wash., 384 F. Supp. 312, 350 (W.D. Wash. 1974). Numerous writers have eloquently
addressed the importance of fish to Indian tribes. See for example: Jim Lichatowich, Salmon Without
Rivers: A History of the Pacific Salmon Crisis (Island Press 1999), and Michael C. Blumm, Sacrificing
the Salmon: A Legal and Policy History of the Decline of Columbia Basin Salmon (Book World Publi-
cations 2002), Judith V. Royster & Michael Blumm, Native American Natural Resources Law (Carolina
Academic Press 2002).
2. U.S. v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) (The Supreme Court affirmed the treaty right of the
Yakima Nation to fish at its "usual and accustomed places," regardless of who owned the land).
3. Id. ("Only a limitation of [aboriginal rights], however, was necessary and intended [by the
treaty with the Yakima], not a taking away. In other words, the treaty was not a grant of rights to the
Indians, but a grant of rights from them - a reservation of those [rights] not granted."). Winans and
subsequent cases drew on the canons of treaty construction that require courts to construe treaties in
favor of the Indians as they would have understood them at the time of signing, and resolve ambiguous
expressions in favor of the Indians. See Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, § 2.02[l],
119-20 (William S. Hein & Co. 1982).
4. For example, Coleville Confederate Tribes v. Walton, 647 F. 2d 42 (9"h Cir. 1981) (Coleville IU)
(holding that the tribes were entitled to sufficient water to maintain a fishery).
5. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000).
6. Id. at § 1536(a)(2). Section 7(a)(2) of the statute requires that actions authorized by federal
agencies not jeopardize the continued existence of listed species, or adversely modify the critical habitat
necessary for their survival and recovery. In order to fulfill this duty, a federal agency contemplating an
action that may affect a listed species or its critical habitat must formally consult with one of the two
agencies that administer ESA, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) in the Department of Interior
and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) in the Department of Commerce.
7. Id. at § 1538(a)(1). Section 9 prohibits all actions that "take" a listed species, where "take" is
defined in 16 U.S.C. §1532(19) as "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or
collect, or to attempt to engage in such conduct." Harm is defined as including significant habitat modi-
fication that kills or injures wildlife. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1999).
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habitat and fish populations. This has contributed to drastically declining
fish populations.8
This paper reviews the key legal decisions addressing tribal rights to
habitat protection and the requirement for habitat protection under the En-
dangered Species Act, delineates the scope of these obligations and dis-
cusses existing ambiguities, constraints, and complementarities. It exam-
ines several cases where coalitions between tribes and environmental
groups created stronger opportunities to enhance the protection of aquatic
habitat and discusses areas of common ground that could provide the basis
for stronger coalitions between these groups.
11. TRIBAL WATER AND FISHING RIGHTS, AND HABITAT PROTECTION
In nineteenth century treaty negotiations with the United States govern-
ment, many western tribes made it clear that fishing rights were essential to
supply them with fish for sustenance and as the centerpiece of their religion
and culture.9 In United States v. Winans, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed
these rights, holding that treaties signed by the United States Government
with fishing tribes established a right to take fish "at all usual and accus-
tomed places." 10
While multiple decisions addressed the scope of this fishing right, the
courts have skirted whether it actually included a right to habitat protection
to sustain tribal fisheries. In the Pacific Northwest, the Columbia River
tribes spent decades in litigation to delineate issues of access and habitat
8. As of October 2005, 114 species of fish had been listed as threatened or endangered in the U.S.
See U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Threatened and Endangered Species System, http://ecos.fws.gov/
tess-public/servlet/gov.doi.tess-public.serviets.TESSBoxscore?format=display&type=archive&sysdate
=10/01/2005 (accessed on Oct. 1, 2005). The Biological Resources Division of the U.S. Geological
Survey describes freshwater fishes as the single most imperiled vertebrate group in the United States.
Status and Trends of the Nation's Biological Resources: Regional Trends of Biological Resources,
Southwest vol. 2, 543, 565 (Micael J. Mac et al. eds., U.S. Geological Survey 1998).
9. U.S. v. Wash., 384 F. Supp. at 350. The importance of usufructory fishing rights to fishing
tribes was eloquently articulated by the court in 1905, stating that "the right to resort to the fishing
places ...were not much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they
breathed. It was clear that the Indians were vitally interested in protecting their right to take fish ... and
they relied on the good faith of the United States to protect that right." Wash. v. Wash. St. Commercial
Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U.S. 658, 680 (1979). "The right to hunt, fish, and gather may be
either explicitly reserved or inferred from the language, intent and surrounding circumstances of a
treaty, executive order or statute." Id. at 667. See Mary Gray Holt, Choosing Harmony: Indian Rights
and the Endangered Species Act, in Donald C. Baur & Win. Robert Irvin, Endangered Species Act:
Law, Policy, Perspectives, 59 (ABA 2002).
10. Winans, 198 U.S. at 379, 381-83. In U.S. v. Taylor, 13 P. 333 (Wash. Terr. 1887), the court
characterized the Yakima fishing right as a servitude on Taylor's (a non-Indian fisher) land. It was a
property right that included access to the river and use of shorelands for housing and drying fish. Id. For
a comprehensive discussion of the Columbia River Tribes' litigation to establish their fishing rights and
the right to habitat protection, see Michael C. Blumm & Brett M. Swift, The Indian Treaty Piscary
Profit and Habitat Protection in the Pacific Northwest: A Property Rights Approach, 69 U. Colo. L.
Rev. 407 (Spring 1998).
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protection. 1 In 1980, the Washington State District Court articulated an
explicit recognition of a right to habitat protection.12  Judge Orrick held
that, if the primary purpose of the United States treaty with the Columbia
River Tribes was to reserve the right to fish as an economic and cultural
way of life, then the treaty must also be interpreted as not allowing actions
"that destroy the fishery."' 13 If loss of salmon habitat were "to continue, the
right to take fish would eventually be reduced to the right to dip one's net
into the water.., and bring it out empty" nullifying "the nine-year effort to
enforce the treaties' reservation to the tribes of a sufficient quantity of fish
to meet their fair needs." 14 But, in an en banc opinion, the district court's
habitat ruling was vacated on other grounds.
15
In subsequent cases, the lower courts affirmed an implicit right to habitat
protection for tribal fisheries, for example, a right to the non-consumptive
use of water to maintain a viable fishery,1 6 and a water right sufficient to
maintain a creek for fishing.17 The courts also indirectly acknowledged the
right to habitat protection by providing tribes with injunctive relief includ-
ing: enjoining dam construction; t8 delaying marina and oil port construc-
11. In Seufert Bros. Co. v. U.S., 249 U.S. 194 (1919), the court enlarged the reach of the fishing
servitude by extending the access rights of Columbia River tribes to all customary fishing stations,
regardless of whether land had been ceded by the tribes to the federal government. in Sohappy v. Smith,
302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969), the court held that these tribal fishers were entitled to a "fair share" of
the harvests, and that salmon conservation for the native fishery was to be considered on a coequal basis
with conservation for other users. When non-native fishers challenged the implementation of Sohappy,
the government filed suit on behalf of seven Washington State tribes (U.S. v. Wash., 384 F. Supp. 312
(W.D. Wash. 1974) (Phase i)). In U.S. v. Wash. (Phase 1), the court held that a "fair share" required the
state to restrict non-natives to fifty percent of the total fish harvest, guaranteeing the tribes also fifty
percent. Wash. St. Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n., 443 U.S. at 682, 686-87. The Su-
preme Court stated that the right to fish included "so much as, but no more than, is necessary to provide
the Indians with a livelihood - that is to say, a moderate living," and they were entitled to more than the
mere chance to dip their nets into empty waters. Id. at 679, 686-87. See generally Blumm and Swift,
supra n. 11, for a detailed history and discussion of this litigation.
12. U.S. v. Wash., 506 F.Supp. 187, 203 (W.D. Wash. 1980) (Phase I).
13. Id. at 204.
14. Id. Where the Supreme Court in Passenger Fishing Vessel had ruled that the tribes' share of
the fish harvest entitled them to no more than a moderate living, Judge Orrick interpreted the treaties to
promise them no less. See Blumm and Swift, supra n. 11, at 416.
15. U.S. v. Wash., 759 F. 2d. 1353 (9 th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Phase III). The court indicated that
without concrete facts it was imprudent to articulate the scope of the habitat right.
16. See Coleville Confederate Tribes, 647 F.2d 42.
17. U.S. v. Anderson, 591 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Wash. 1982), afftd, 736 F. 2d 1358 (9 th Cir 1984) (cited
in Brian J. Perron, When Tribal Treaty Fishing Rights Become a Mere Opportunity to Dip One's Net
into the Water and Pull it Out Empty: The Case for Money Damages when Treaty-Reserved Fish Habi-
tat is Degraded, 25 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Policy Rev. 783 (Spring 2001)). For additional discus-
sions on treaty fishing rights see 0. Yale Lewis III, Treaty Fishing Rights: A Habitat Right as Part of
the Trinity of Rights Implied by the Fishing Clause of the Stevens Treaties, 27 Am. Indian L. Rev. 281
(2002-2003).
18. Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Alexander, 440 F. Supp. 553 (D. Or.
1977) (Oregon issued a declaratory judgment requiring the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to seek con-
gressional approval before constructing a dam across Catherine Creek in Northeastern Oregon because
the dam would flood the Indian's fishing grounds and stations on Eliot Bay, Seattle).
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tion;19 preventing construction of a pen "fish farm; ' 20 and awarding water
rights to protect treaty fisheries.' In Nez Perce v. Idaho Power Company,
the court again recognized a habitat protection right for the fishery, but held
that compensation was unavailable to compensate tribes for past losses due
to development.
A. Indian Water Rights and Habitat Protection
Habitat protection for fish clearly includes sufficient water to maintain
the fishery, including the amount and timing of water flows, as well as wa-
ter quality. Three years after Winans, Indian tribes' also established power-
ful claims to water in a second foundational case, Winters v. United States,
where the Supreme Court held that the treaty setting aside the Fort Belknap
Indian Reservation implied a concurrent reservation of rights to enough
water to fulfill the purposes of the reservation.23 The priority date of a Win-
ters' water right is the date the reservation was created, and it is not subject
to forfeiture or abandonment for non-use. 24 The early establishment of
19. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Hass, 698 F. Supp. 1504 (W.D. Wash 1988) (granting tribes
request for preliminary injunction of marina construction).
20. N.W. Sea Farms v. U.S. Army Corps. of Engineers, 931 F. Supp. 1515 (W.D. Wash. 1981)
(upholding the denial of a permit for a fish farm).
21. Kittitas Reclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist., 763 F.2d. 1032 (9th Cir. 1985)
(awarding tribes water rights to protect treaty fishery).
22. Nez Perce v. Idaho Power Co., 847 F. Supp. 791, 811 (D. Idaho 1994); see Blumm and Swift,
supra n. 11, and Perron supra n. 18, at 481-89 for a discussion of this case.
23. Winters v. U.S., 207 U.S. 564 (1908). See Daniel McCool, Command of the Waters: Iron
Triangles, Federal Water, and Indian Water (U. of Cal. Press 1987), for the history and background of
the Winters case. With regard to interpretations of the "purpose" of the reservation, the Supreme Court
in U.S. v. N.M., 438 U.S. 696, 700 (1978) distinguished between the primary and secondary purposes of
a reservation, holding that water is impliedly reserved only for the primary purposes of federal reserva-
tions. However, the Court has not yet applied this principle to Indian water rights, and the lower courts
have not ruled on a definitive definition of the "purpose" of Indian reservations. For example, in Col-
ville Confederated Tribes, 647 F.2d at 48, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981), the court held that the
general purpose of Indian reservations was to provide tribes with a homeland, but that the primary
purposes were twofold, both agriculture and the preservation of the tribes fishery. The court then stated
that as the Colville tribes were a traditional fishing culture, the preservation of their access to historic
fishing sites was one purpose in establishing the reservation. In U.S. v. Adair, 478 F. Supp 336, 339 (D.
Or. 1979), the court also found two main purposes for the Klamath reservation, with water reserved for
both. The first purpose was to convert the tribes to an agricultural society and the amount of water
reserved for this came under the PIA standard. The second purpose was preservation of the aboriginal
practice of hunting, fishing and gathering, and the court ruled that this water right was an in-stream flow
right that served to prevent others from drawing down the water needed to sustain the tribe's fishing
right. In an early non-Indian reserved rights case, Cappaert v. U.S., 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976), the
Supreme Court also qualified the amount of water reserved as "only the amount of water necessary to
fulfill the purposes of the reservation, no more." Clearly, how a court chooses to define a reservation's
purpose can be significant for the protection of aquatic habitat, and this remains an area of unsettled law.
24. Winters, at 564, 577. See also Ariz. v. Cal., 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963). In addition, if prior to
the creation of the reservation, a tribe's past water uses were confirmed by the treaty, agreement, or
executive order creating the reservation, the water rights have a "time immemorial" priority date. For
example, for tribes historically dependent on fishing, water for the preservation of the fisheries would
carry a time immemorial priority date. U.S. v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1413-15 (C.A. Or. 1983) (Adair
Ill). See Judith V. Royster, A Primer on Indian Water Rights, 30 Tulsa L. J. 61 (Fall 1994), for a com-
prehensive discussion of Indian water rights.
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most Indian reservations means that a Winters' water right is superior to
most other western water rights.25
In Arizona v. California, the court quantified a Winters' right as the
amount necessary to irrigate the reservation's practicably irrigable acreage
(PIA).26 The problem was that the PIA standard resulted in Indian water
rights being primarily for out-of-stream diversions for use in irrigation, and
an essential habitat requirement to sustain a fishery is sufficient in-stream
water.27 In Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, the court also acknowl-
edged a non-consumptive in-stream flow right28 for "sufficient water to
permit natural spawning of the trout., 29 In U.S. v. Adair, the court relied on
language in U.S. v. Washington to qualify the measure of the water right to
sustain a fishery, limiting it to water sufficient to provide a moderate liveli-
hood for Indians.3°
The court again recognized an explicit right to habitat protection in U.S.
v. Adair (Adair 1I), 31 holding that the treaty right to fish included a tribe's
aboriginal water right and "a confirmation to the tribe of such a right to the
extent necessary to support its hunting and fishing lifestyle. 32 However,
25. Most western water rights are regulated under the Doctrine of Prior Appropriation with a first
in time, first in right requirement. Under Winters, water which is already subject to vested appropriation
rights as of the date of creation of the reservation is unavailable to fulfill Winters rights. However,
because of the early date of creation of most Indian reservations, there are few state appropriation rights
that predate Indian reservations. On water rights, see generally Joseph Sax, Barton Thompson, John D.
Leshy, & Robert Abrams, Legal Control of Water Resources: Cases and Materials, (3' ed., West 2001).
26. Ariz., 373 U.S. at 600-01. The standard followed from one of the goals of reservation policy
that was to establish agrarian Indian communities. The Supreme Court affirmed the Special Master's
ruling that the appropriate measure of Indian water rights was an agricultural measure, and stated that
the PIA standard would provide sufficient water "to satisfy the future as well as the present needs of the
Indian Reservations." Id. at 600. The Court rejected the tribes' "reasonably foreseeable needs" as intro-
ducing too much uncertainty into western water law. Id. at 600-01. See generally Royster, supra n. 25,
on Indian water rights.
27. In addition to the amount and timing of in-stream water flows, temperature and sediment load-
ing requirements are significant factors in sustaining healthy fisheries. Storage facilities block access to
miles of streams, impeding historic migration and spawning routes and cause changes in temperature,
sediment loadings, river channels and seasonal flows, and these have played a significant role in the
collapse of western fisheries. Western Water Policy Review Advisory Committee, Water in the West:
Challenge for the Next Century (1998). See generally Holly Doremus, Water, Population Growth and
Endangered Species in the West, 72 U. Colo. L. Rev. 361 (Spring 2001).
28. One purpose of the Colville Reservation was the preservation of its fishery. Colville Confeder-
ated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 48 (9"' Cir.1981) (Walton I), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
See also Royster, supra n. 25, at 72-73.
29. Id. The amount was finally fixed at 350 acre feet per year. Colville Confederated Tribes v.
Walton, 752 F. 2d 397, 404-05 (9" Cir. 1985) (Walton I). See Royster, supra n. 25, at 77 and Blumm,
supra n. 2.
30. Adair, 723 F.2d at 1414-15. This standard is derived from the Supreme Court's Passenger
Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U.S. 658. The Adair litigation arose at roughly the same time as Phase II of
the United States v. Wash. litigation. See generally Ryan Sudbury, When Good Streams Go Dry: the
United States v. Adair and the Unprincipled Elimination of a Federal Forum for Treaty Reserved
Rights, 25 Pub. Land & Res. L. Rev. 147 (2004), for a discussion of the Adair cases.
31. Adair, 723 F.2d. at 1414.
32. Id. See also Sudbury, supra n. 31. Unlike the vacated habitat protection decision in U.S. v.
Washington, in Adair III, the U.S. and the Klamath tribes presented "a concrete set of facts to which the
habitat protection standard could be applied with certainty." Id. at 168.
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this explicit affirmation of the right to habitat protection was again thrust
aside when the Ninth Circuit vacated the decision on grounds that the case
was not ripe.33
Today most Indian reserved water rights are still stipulated to be for con-
sumptive use, primarily for irrigation, and they are quantified using the PIA
standard. In-stream flow rights to sustain habitat for a fishery remain un-
common. A right to in-stream flows is contrary to the tradition and history
of the western law of prior appropriation which requires that water must be
taken out of a stream and used for beneficial purposes in order to perfect a
right. Water left in the stream was historically considered wasteful. Thus,
the normal hostility to Indian water rights is exacerbated in the case of in-
stream flow rights.34 While many states today allow qualified in-stream
flow rights, there are still concerns about awarding these rights and the
practice remains infrequent.
Court decisions have also been ambiguous regarding a tribe's right to
change its water use, originally set aside for one purpose such as irrigation,
to another purpose, such as maintaining a sufficient in-stream flow to sus-
tain a fishery.35 In Arizona v. California, the Supreme Court held that PIA
,,36
method "shall not constitute a restriction of the usage ... to irrigation.
Later, in Colville, the Ninth Circuit held that tribes could adapt their water
rights to modern usages.37 But, in Big Horn III, the Wyoming Supreme
Court ruled that tribes did not have a right to switch a portion of their PIA
water rights awarded for future irrigation projects to in-stream flows for
fisheries, but the court did not rule as to current PIA water usage.38 There
have been no recent definitive Supreme Court decisions on these issues.
Even more important, since the Winters' decision, the reserved water rights
of Indian tribes have been almost entirely disregarded by state and federal
governments with authority over water allocation.39 Recent court decisions
33. Adair, 723 F.2d. at 1404.
34. See discussions in Royster, supra n. 25 and Blumm, supra n. 2.
35. See Royster, supra n. 25, at 78-82.
36. Ariz. v. CaL, 439 U.S. 419, 422 (1979), rehearing denied, 462 U.S. 1146 (1983).
37. Colville Confederated Tribes, 647 F. 2d 42, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
38. In Re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 835 P.2d
273, 285 (1992) (Big Horn II). See Royster, supra n. 25, at 79-81 for a good discussion of the Big
Horn cases.
39. In particular, whereas other western communities have benefited from federal funding for
reclamation projects, this financing has not been available to the Indian Tribes. See generally McCool,
supra n. 24. In its 1973 report, the National Water Commission stated: "Following Winters ... the
United States was pursuing a policy of encouraging the settlement of the West and the creation of fam-
ily-sized farms on its arid lands. In retrospect, it can be seen that this policy was pursued with little or
no regard for Indian water rights and the Winters doctrine. With the encouragement, or at least the
cooperation, of the Secretary of the Interior - the very office entrusted with the protection of all Indian
rights - many large irrigation projects were, constructed on streams that flowed through or bordered
Indian Reservations, sometimes above and more often below the Reservations. With few exceptions the
projects were planned and built by the Federal Government without any attempt to define, let alone
protect prior rights that Indian tribes might have had in the waters used for the projects." United States
National Water Commission, Water Policies for the Future: Final Report to the President and to the
20081
PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29
constraining Indian water rights also express concerns that un-quantified
and un-exercised reserved rights with a very early priority date could con-
strain investments in non-Indian water projects. 4° These legacies contribute
to a political climate today that makes it difficult for tribes to receive favor-
able settlements in court, and where they do, to implement their court-
granted paper rights and obtain wet water for irrigation purposes and to
sustain a fishery. In addition, their fishing right remains essentially unful-
filled due to the significant decline in western fisheries.41
III. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND HABITAT PROTECTION
It is clear from the language, history and structure of the Endangered
Species Act42 that Congress intended the protection of endangered species
and their habitat to be afforded the highest of priorities.43 However, as with
a right to habitat protection for Indian tribes, courts generally affirmed a
basic requirement for habitat protection for listed species under ESA, but
were inconsistent regarding the scope of this protection; and, as a result,
federal agencies often circumvented implementation."
There are several provisions in the ESA that address habitat protection.
Section 7 prohibits federal agencies from undertaking activities that destroy
or adversely modify critical habitat,45 Section 4 directs that critical habitat
Congress of the United States 474-75 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973). See also
David Getches, Indian Water Rights Conflicts in Perspective, in Indian Water in the New West, 13
(Thomas R. McGuire et al. eds.,U. of Ariz. Press 1993). As an example, the irrigation system on the
Fort Belknap Reservation where the Winters case arose is still only half complete and the tribes still lack
adequate means to develop their water today. Id. at 18.
40. Sax et al., supra n. 26.
41. The major alteration of natural water flows, sediment load and temperature resulting from the
plethora of non-Indian water projects, particularly dam construction and maintenance, has significantly
damaged aquatic habitat and decimated salmon runs in the area west of the Rocky Mountains as a
whole, 70 percent of native fish species are already extinct or currently imperiled. See Sustainability of
Western Native Fish Resources in Aquatic Ecosystems Symposium: A Report to the Western Water
Policy Review Advisory Commission 63, 73 (W.L. Minckley ed., Western Water Policy Review Advi-
sory Commission 1997) (cited in Doremus, supra n. 28, at n. 26).
42. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq.
43. Species are listed as mandated by ESA to be either endangered - in danger of extinction
throughout all or a substantial portion of their range, or threatened - not yet endangered but likely to
reach that point in the foreseeable future. Id. at § 1532(6), (20). In 1978, Senator Jake Gam stated that
"the designation of critical habitat is more important than the designation of an endangered species
itself," 124 Cong. Rec. 21575 (1978). See also TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978).
44. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service for example has used the terms "not prudent" or "not de-
terminable" to avoid designation critical habitat for a large majority of all endangered and threatened
species. FWS regulations state that the designation of a critical habitat is not prudent if: a) The species
is threatened by taking or other human activity and identifying its critical habitat can be expected to
increase the degree if the treat, or b) the designation of a critical habitat would not be beneficial to the
species. See 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(a)(1). See Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and its
Implementation by the U.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 277, 303
(1993). Of the 1,268 domestic species of plants and animals listed as of October 2005, 466 have desig-
nated critical habitat. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Threatened and Endangered Species System,
http://ecos.fws.gov/tess-public/servlet/gov.doi.tess.public.servlets.CriticalHabitat?listings--&nmfs=1#
E (Oct. 2005).
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a).
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be designated concurrent with a species listing,46 and Section 5 provides a
means for obtaining funding for acquisition of habitat areas.47 Section 9
prohibits activities that significantly modify or degrade habitat where the
action actually kills or injures wildlife, 8 and Section 10 contains provisions
that enable private landowners to create habitat conservation plans and ob-
tain incidental take permits.
a9
A. Critical Habitat Under ESA
Section 7 of the 1973 ESA mandates that federal agency actions not de-
stroy or adversely modify the "critical habitat" of endangered or threatened
species.50  To clarify the criteria for critical habitat, the National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)
promulgated regulations that defined it broadly as: "[A]ny air, land, or wa-
ter area ... and constituent element thereof, the loss of which would appre-
ciably decrease the likelihood of the survival and recovery of a listed spe-
cies or a distinct population segment of its population., 51 Early case law
supported the importance of critical habitat in avoiding jeopardy. In Na-
tional Wildlife v. Coleman, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a
project that would disturb and destroy habitat vital to the listed Mississippi
46. Id. at § 1533(a)(3).
47. Id. at §§ 1534(b), 1536(a)(2).
48. Id. at § 1538(a)(1). This section applies only to endangered species of fish or wildlife. Under
Section 4(d) the FWS and NMFS are granted the discretionary authority to extend any of the prohibi-
tions of Section 9(a)(1) to threatened wildlife species. By regulation, FWS has generally extended the
Section 9 take prohibition to threatened species. 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a). NMFS does this on a species by
species basis.
49. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B).
50. Id. at § 1536(a). Federico Cheever presents an excellent overview of critical habitat in Endan-
gered Species Act: Critical Habitat, in Donald C. Baur & Win. Robert Irvin, Endangered Species Act:
Law, Policy, Perspectives, 47 (ABA, 2002).
51. 43 Fed. Reg. 870, 874 (Jan. 4, 1978). This definition required that critical habitat include por-
tions of a listed species' present habitat as well as additional areas needed for recovery of the popula-
tion. In 1978 amendments to the ESA, Congress clarified that critical habitat must include (i) the spe-
cific areas within the geographical area occupied by the species at the time it is listed on which are
found those physical and biological features (1) essential to the conservation of the species and (2)
which may require special management considerations or protections; and (ii) the specific areas outside
the geographical area occupied by the species at the time it is listed ... upon a determination by the
Secretary that such areas are essential for the conservation of the species. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A). The
definition of conservation in ESA is significant: "the use of all methods and procedures which are nec-
essary to bring any endangered species or threatened species to the point at which the measures provided
pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3). In other words, "Congress
defined 'critical habitat' with recovery of species in mind." (Cheever, supra n. 51, at 49). FWS reiter-
ated this in its determination of critical habitat for four species of endangered fish on the Colorado
River, stating that "In the case of critical habitat, conservation represents the areas required to recover a
species to the point of de-listing... in this context, critical habitat preserves options for a species even-
tual recovery." Determination of Critical Habitat for the Colorado River Endangered Fishes: Razor-
back Sucker, Colorado Squawfish, Humpback Chub, and Bonytail Chub, 59 Fed. Reg. 13374, 13377
(March 21, 1994) (cited in Cheever, Endangered Species Act: Critical Habitat, supra n. 51, at 49-51, n.
17).
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Sandhill Crane would violate Section 7 by jeopardizing the crane.52 In the
frequently cited case, Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill (TVA), the Su-
preme Court affirmed the power of Section 7 and the importance of critical
habitat by enjoining the construction of a multimillion-dollar dam that
would have flooded the habitat of the snail darter, listed as threatened under
the ESA.53
During the 1980s and early 1990s, the FWS and NMFS routinely de-
clined to designate critical habitat for newly listed species. Recent cases
however, have challenged this practice. In Natural Resources Defense
Council v. Department of the Interior,4 the court stated that FWS violated
ESA by failing to designate critical habitat for the coastal California gnat-
catcher, and in Building Industry Association of Superior California v.
Babbitt, the court held that FWS' argument for not designating critical habi-
tat was unsupported by the record.55 In Conservation Councilfor Hawaii v.
Babbitt, the court rejected the FWS's assertion that jeopardy consultation
was functionally equivalent to "consultation" under the destruction/adverse
modification standard.56
Critical habitat designation is not required at the time of listing if it is not
determinable, and while agencies frequently decline to designate critical
habitat on that basis, 57 the courts have also challenged such agency deci-
sions.58 In Northern Spotted Owl v. Lujan for example, the federal court
stated "the designation of critical habitat is to coincide with the final listing
decision absent extraordinary circumstances ., 59 In Pacific Coast Federa-
tion of Fisherman's Association v. NMFS, the court stressed that the agency
must consider near-term habitat loss to populations with short life cycles,
and faulted the agency for only considering the impact of its actions over a
ten-year period. 60  Despite the requirement that the designation of critical
habitat consider not only the best scientific data available but also economic
61 62impacts, its designation continually comes under attack in Congress.
52. Natl. Wildlife Fedn. v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 367 (5"' Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. 400,
407 F. Supp. 705, 707 (S.D. Miss. 1975), rev'd, 529 F. 2d 359, 367 (5 h Cir. 1976).
53. TVA, 437 U.S. 153 (enjoining the operation of the federal government's nearly-completed
Tellico Dam on the Little Tennessee River because the operation would "take" the federally endangered
snail darter fish that lived in the river).
54. Natl. Resources Def Council v. Dept. of Interior, 113 F. 3d 1121 (9" Cir. 1997) (NRDC l).
55. Building Industry Assn. of Superior Cal. v. Babbitt, 979 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1997), appeal
dismissed, 161 F. 3d 740,906 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
56. Conservation Council for Hawaii v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1280 (D. Haw. 1998).
57. Critical habitat is not determinable when: i) Information sufficient to perform required analyses
of the impacts of designation is lacking or ii) The biological needs of the species are not sufficiently
well known to permit identification of an area as critical habitat. 50 C.F.R. § 424.12 (a)(2).
58. See for example: Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 164 F.3d 1261 (10"t Cir. 1998), and Colo. Wild-
life Fedn. v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 36 E.R.C. (BNA) 1409 (D. Colo. 1992).
59. N. Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp 621,626 (W.D. Wash 1991).
60. P. Coast Fedn. of Fisherman's Assn. v. N.M.F.S., 265 F.3d 1028, 1037-38 (9th Cir. 2001).
61. 50 C.F.R. § 424.19.
62. See for example, H.R. 3824, Threatened and Endangered Species Recovery Act of 2005,
passed in the House on September 29, 2005.
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B. Section 9, the "No Take" Requirement, and the Definition of Harm
Section 9 of the ESA also explicitly addresses habitat protection. This
section makes it unlawful for any person to "take" any species listed as
endangered, where "take" is defined as "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt,
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in such
conduct., 63 Because so much rides on the word "take," there has been a
great deal of controversy over its definition, and in particular over NMFS'
definition of harm as including habitat modification. NMFS defined harm
with respect to fish species as "an act which actually kills or injures wild-
life. Such an act may include significant habitat modification or degrada-
tion where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing
essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, spawning, rearing, feed-
ing or sheltering." 64 Specific activities that may constitute harm include
construction of migration barriers, alteration of stream-flows, sediment in-
put into streams from timber harvest, grazing, road-building and mining,
and land-use activities that increase erosion.
Initially, in a series of cases focusing on the Palila, a Hawaiian honey-
creeper, the courts adopted a broad definition of harm." 65 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed that "harm" included habitat modification that threatened a species
with extinction, however, it declined to address whether the regulations'
requirement for "actual death or injury," could by satisfied be including
habitat modification that hindered a species' recovery.66 The distinction is
significant in that a large category of activities may hamper the goal of re-
covery while still falling short of precipitating a species' extinction.6 7
In Sweet Home Communities for a Greater Oregon v. Babbitt, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals and the Ninth Circuit focused on the
understanding of harm as stated in Palila II. A split in their interpretations
resulted in the Supreme Court granting certiorari. 68 The harm rule was up-
held in a facial challenge to the regulation, and the court affirmed that indi-
rect injury to a listed species through habitat modification could constitute a
63. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
64. 50 C.F.R. § 222.102.
65. Palila v. Haw. Dept. of Land and Natl. Resources, 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1075 (D. Haw. 1986)
(Palila U), aft'd, 852 F. 2d 1106 (9"h Cir. 1988). The court ruled that the state of Hawaii was engaging in
the take of the palila finch (Loxioides bailleui) by permitting sheep to graze on mamane-naio tree seed-
lings that when fully grown could have been used by future finches for nesting and foraging. The dis-
trict court stated that "a finding of "harm" does not require death to individual members of the species;
nor does it require that habitat degradation is presently driving the species further toward extinction.
Habitat destruction that prevents the recovery of the species by affecting essential behavioral patterns,
and causes actual injury to the species, effects a taking under Section 9 of the Act. For extensive back-
ground on the Palila I & II cases, see Kenneth J. Plante and Andrew J. Baumann, Babbit v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon: Preserving the "Critical Link" Between Habitat Modifi-
cation and the "Taking" of an Endangered Species, 20 Nova L. Rev. 747, 758-75 (Winter 1996).
66. Palla // Appeal, 852 F. 2d at 1110.
67. Plante and Bauman, supra n. 66, at 773.
68. Sweet Home Communities, 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
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"take" prohibited by the ESA. However, in a footnote the Court narrowed
the interpretation of harm through habitat modification. The majority indi-
cated that before habitat modification could be considered a take, FWS had
to prove that the actions of the "taking" party were the proximate cause of
death or injury to the particular species and that the events that caused
minimal or unforeseeable harm would not violate the ESA as construed in
the harm regulation. They stated that the task of determining whether
proximate causation exists was best left to the lower courts. 6 9  Justice
O'Connor's concurrence went further, stating that only those actions that
"completely prevented" breeding or made it "impossible," could be defined
as habitat modification under the FWS definition of harm. 70 This left open
the degrees of proof and causation required before the indirect injury
threshold was met. Subsequent court decisions have required stronger
proof that an activity will do more than merely hinder breeding, feeding,
sheltering or spawning, and have concluded that an activity must proxi-
mately cause the actual death or injury to a particular species.71
Subsequent lower court decisions were also inconsistent in upholding a
requirement to habitat protection under Section 9, finding that habitat modi-
fication could cause harm to listed species and thus constitute unlawful take
only in certain circumstances. In Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal, scientific
experts at trial testified that the pygmy owl would likely be harmed by a
development of land where the owl was located. 72 Nevertheless, the dis-
trict court judge ruled against finding a "take" in the absence of a showing
that owls were actually present in the area in which the proposed activities
were to occur, and the decision was upheld on appeal.73 However, in
United States v. Glen Colusa Irrigation District, the court held that in the
Sacramento River in California, where winter-run Chinook salmon were
listed under ESA, the fish screens and dams that blocked passage of the
migrating fish would not have been constructed "but for" irrigation pump-
ing from the river, and therefore, the irrigation pumping caused a "take,"
69. Id. at 697-700. In Justice O'Connor's concurrence, she questioned the Palila 11 decision and
stated that destruction of the seedlings did not proximately cause actual death or injury to identifiable
birds; it merely prevented the regeneration of forest land not currently sustaining actual birds. Id. at 713-
14 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
70. /d.at710.
71. See generally James R. Rasband, Priority, Probability, and Proximate Cause: Lessons from
Tort Law about Imposing ESA Responsibility for Wildlife Harm on Water Users and Other Joint Habitat
Modifiers, 33 Envtl. L. 595 (Summer 2003), for a good discussion of Section 9. Also Steven P. Quarles
and Thomas R. Lundquist, When Do Land Use Activities "Take" Listed Wildlife Under ESA Section 9
and the "Harm" Regulation, in Donald C. Baur & Wm. Robert Irvin, Endangered Species Act: Law
Policy and Perspective (ABA 2002); Gina Guy, Take Prohibitions and Section 9, in Donald C. Baur &
Wm. Robert Irvin, Endangered Species Act: Law Policy and Perspective (ABA 2002); and Sean C.
Skaggs, Judicial Interpretation of Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act Before and After Sweet
Home: More of the Same, in Donald C. Baur & Wm. Robert Irvin, Endangered Species Act: Law, Policy
and Perspective (ABA 2002).
72. Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal, 204 F.3d 920 (9 " Cir. 2000).
73. Id. at 927.
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and the modification of water permits to ensure adequate water flows for
fish was permissible. 4 In Idaho Watersheds Project v. Jones, the court
held that a private irrigator could not divert water from a Creek without
specific structures in place to protect the threatened bull trout.75 But, in
Arizona Cattle Growers' Ass'n v. United States Department of Fish and
Wildlife, the Ninth Circuit narrowed the indirect injury provision of Section
9, and held that habitat modification alone, without a showing of actual
death or injury to an endangered species, is not a "take. ' 76 Without any
clear guidance yet from the Supreme Court as to when habitat modification
results in the "take" of a species, this remains an area of unsettled law.
IV. POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS TO ESTABLISHING A RIGHT TO HABITAT
PROTECTION
A. Shifting Societal Goals and Habitat Protection
The judicial trend is to affirm a basic right to water and fish for Indian
tribes, but to narrow its scope. In addition, while recognizing an implicit
right.to habitat protection for tribal fisheries, the court has yet to affirm an
explicit right that would enable tribes to restore their fisheries. Similarly,
despite significant legal victories under the Endangered Species Act, the
courts and administering agencies are also inconsistent in making clear the
extent of the requirement for habitat protection under ESA. There is a fail-
ure to actually achieve sufficient protection and restoration of fish species
and their aquatic habitat throughout the west.
77
Several major concerns speak to the courts unwillingness to clarify the
scope of habitat protection required for Indian tribes and under ESA. The
first involves the conflicts that abound today over shifting attitudes towards
water use - the redistribution and alteration of natural water flows support-
ing irrigated agriculture and municipal development at the expense of de-
graded rivers, denuded fisheries and the communities that relied on these
resources. Holly Doremus discusses how when Europeans moved west-
74. U.S. v. Glen Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126, 1133 (E.D.Cal. 1992). See also Oka-
nogan County v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 2002 LEXIS 13625 (D. Wash. March 13, 2002).
75. Idaho Watersheds Project v. Jones, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27589 at *33 (D. Idaho. November
14, 2002). The court stated that "[tihe diversion significantly modifies the habitat of the bull trout by
reducing flows below the diversion and diverting bull trout into the irrigation ditch ... These two threats
combine to create a reasonably certain threat of imminent harm to the bull trout under § 9 of the ESA."
76. AZ Cattle Growers Assn. v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 273 F.3d 1229, 1238 (9,h cir. 2001).
See Paul Stinson, Arizona Cattle Growers Association v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service: Has the Ninth
Circuit Weakened the "Take" Provisions of the Endangered Species Act, 30 Ecol. L.Q. 497 (2003), for
an analysis of this case.
77. Associated Press, Half of Oregon's Wild Fish Face Extinction (Aug. 31, 2005). A status report
by Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife biologists has determined that out of 69 distinct fish popula-
tions in Oregon, including all salmon and steelhead species and most trout populations, nearly one half
of all populations are at risk of extinction and eight historic populations are already extinct. See gener-
ally Doremus, supra n. 28.
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ward, they brought with them a consumptive ethic78 that promoted large
scale water development to supply human and material needs, perceiving
this to be the highest and best use of natural resources. 79 The result was
years of allocating water for irrigation, power and municipal expansion for
non-Indians, while ignoring both the environmental impacts of these poli-
cies and the legally recognized rights of Indian tribes to water and fish.8° In
addition, the market economy introduced by white settlers was fundamen-
tally different than the "gift economy" of Indian Tribes that had evolved
over 1,500 years.8 ' Salmon and other natural resources were captured and
sold for profit without any internal checks to moderate their use. The new
economy displaced tribal fishers and, through altered fishing techniques and
the continuous loss of salmon habitat, devastated the salmon resource.82
In the past few decades, the west saw a shift away from a major reliance
on resource extraction and the construction of massive water storage and
diversion projects. This was coupled with an expanded effort by Indian
Tribes to access their water and fishing rights, and efforts by the environ-
mental community to protect and restore degraded ecosystems including
rivers and fisheries. 83  As the previously disregarded claims of environ-
mental groups and Indian tribes gained new salience, and as the public re-
focused its goals to include the support of river and fishery restoration,
those who relied on past allocations resisted change.
Many non-Indians view Indian reserved water rights as a potential threat
to the survival of their interests, 84 and the specter of Indians becoming wa-
ter brokers has hindered tribes attempting to secure the actual benefits of
their water.85  Similarly, the ESA generates a great deal of public uncer-
tainty regarding how to resolve the tensions between development and
preservation of species and their habitat, and respecting existing uses and
86promoting environmental restoration. In particular, the designation ofcritical habitat and the prohibition of any "take" significantly affects private
78. Id. at 364 (citing Eric T. Freyfogle, The Owning and Taking of Sensitive Lands, 43 UCLA L.
Rev. 77, 96 (1995)).
79. Doremus, supra n. 28, at 364.
80. See generally McCool, supra n. 24 (a history of conflict over water between Indians and non-
Indians).
81. Lichatowich, supra n. 2, at 33-51 and Blumm, supra n. 2, at 65.
82. Blumm, supra n. 2, at 63-65.
83. Ruth Langridge, Negotiating Contentious Claims to Water, 2003, U.C. Berkeley, dissertation.
Ruth Langridge, Negotiating Contentious Claims to Water : Shifting Institutional Dynamics for the
Allocation of Water Between the Eel and Russian River Basins (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, U. of
Cal., June 1, 2004) (copy on file with eScholarship Repository at http://repositories.cdlib.org/
wrc/tcr/gilless).
84. This threat was apparent during a 1988 drought, when a Wyoming Supreme Court decision
resulted in placing limits on the water diversions of non-Indian irrigators so that a tribal fishery could be
maintained throughout a dry year. See Getches, supra n. 40, at 7-8.
85. For example, Winters' rights, as property rights, should by definition be transferable, but this
has not generally been permitted for tribes. Id. at 21.
86. See Joseph L. Sax, Environmental Law at the Turn of the Century: A Reportorial Fragment of
Contemporary History, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 2375, 2379 (Dec. 2000).
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landowners. In 1982, Congress addressed the tension between the activities
of private landowners and the "no take" provision of ESA by adding addi-
tional provisions to allow for incidental "take" as part of a habitat conserva-
tion plan where the Secretary can issue an incidental take permit (ITP)
when assured mitigations will occur and the applicant will not appreciably
reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in the
wild.87 Although the habitat conservation program was expanded during
88the Clinton administration, opponents of ESA continue their efforts to
weaken habitat protection provisions.89
A second major concern for tribes and environmental groups is the ques-
tion of how to delineate the baseline for restoring ecosystems. The courts
have been wary of affirming a right to habitat protection for tribes to sustain
a fishery because it might be interpreted as a "wilderness" servitude, and
require a restoration of conditions that existed at the time a reservation was
created. This could result in a widespread halt in development. However,
Blumm and Swift point out that no tribe has pushed for a return to treaty
conditions. 90 In addition, they argue that the way to avoid concern with a
"wilderness" servitude is to confine the scope of the treaty right only to
actions or developments that "unreasonably interfere" with the tribe's at-
tainment of a moderate living. They propose that this include a requirement
that a proposed development effect the least restrictive imposition on treaty
rights available to achieve its benefits, and all reasonable measures are in-
corporated to reduce its adverse effects on treaty fishing. In addition, if
there is a loss or diminishment of treaty rights that impair the tribes' mod-
erate living standard, "just compensation" should be provided to the
tribes.91
87. The 1982 amendments included two separate incidental take authorizations. Section 7 could
authorize certain takings that were in compliance with the terms and conditions set forth in an "inciden-
tal take statement" issued by FWA as part of a Section 7 biological opinion. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(o).
Amendments were also added to Section 10 authorizing the secretary to issue "incidental take permits"
to applicants who have prepared conservation plans that meet established criteria. 16 U.S.C. §
1539(a)(2)(A)(B). Section 10 (a) addressed situations where a private property owner's otherwise lawful
activities might result in a limited "take" of threatened or endangered species. 16 U.S.C. §
1539(a)(2)(A). The ESA mandates that for each HCP, a permit applicant is required to specify: (i) the
impact likely to result from an incidental taking, (ii) steps that will minimize and mitigate such impacts
and funding available to implement them, and (iii) alternative actions considered.
88. See Karen Donovan, "HCPs: Important Tools for Conserving Habitat and Species," in Donald
C. Baur & Wm. Robert Irvin, Endangered Species Act: Law, Policy, and Perspectives, 320-29 (ABA
2002). Habitat Protection Plans are also critiqued, particularly the "no surprises" provision requiring a
long term locked in plan that avoids the possibility of private landowners having to assume liability for
new species found on their land. However, if properly administered, HCPs can provide a way to address
the tension between habitat protection and human activities. When community outreach is included as
part of the negotiation process, along with both monitoring and adaptive management, the HCP process
can potentially increase both the acceptance and achievement of habitat protection.
89. See Threatened and Endangered Species Recovery Act, H.R. 3824, 109"h Cong. (Sept. 30,
2005) (passes in the House of Representatives).
90. Blumm and Swift, supra n. 11, at 490.
91. Id.at497-99.
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Similarly, fulfilling the mandate of ESA to recover species through Sec-
tion 7 and 9 could require a reversion to some previous condition where
human activity was at a minimum. Congress expressed this concern when
it stated that the designation of critical habitat could lead to designating all
habitats of a listed species as their critical habitat, thereby increasing area
designated as critical habitat.92 This could "increase proportionately the
area that is subject to the regulations and prohibitions which apply to criti-
cal habitat., 93 In practice however, under Sections 7 and 9 agencies include
only specific areas occupied by the species at the time of listing, with fea-
tures "essential" to the conservation of the species, although FWS has also
added that areas not currently containing essential features, but which might
in the future, may be designated as critical habitat.
94
V. CULTURAL CONSTRAINTS TO ESTABLISHING A RIGHT TO HABITAT
PROTECTION
A. Reconciling Tribal Goals and Environmental Interests
Habitat protection is clearly critical for many tribes who rely on adequate
water to sustain essential fisheries. Tribes have challenged policies that
degraded watersheds and won, relying on treaty claims as well as on the
Endangered Species Act. These victories achieved some of the same goals
that environmental groups pushed for and litigated under ESA. In addition,
both communities ran into similar conflicts regarding the reallocation of
previously appropriated water and the need to balance conservation and
development. Tribes and environmental groups can achieve better repre-
sentation and ultimately greater protection for fisheries and aquatic habitat
by finding areas of common ground and forming strategic coalitions. One
problem is that fundamentally, the resource concerns of tribal communities
and environmental groups emerge from different roots. 95 For many Indian
people, the notion of water as a commodity and the "ownership" of water,
land or other natural resources is foreign. In addition, litigation initiated by
non-Indians has often disrupted tribal water rights,96 as well as hunting and
92. Cheever, supra n. 51, at49.
93. However, Section 3(5)(c) appears to limit the areas that may be designated to not include "the
entire geographical area which can be occupied by the endangered or threatened species" except "in
circumstances to by decided by the Secretary." Endangered Species Act 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (5)(c) (cited
in Cheever, supra n. 51, at 49).
94. See Cheever, supra n. 51, 50-51 (citing 16 U.S.C. 1532(5)(A)(ii)).
95. Chelsea Congdon, Environmental Management and the Effects of Water Use, in Indian Water
1997: Trends and Directions in Federal Water Policy, Report to the Western Water Policy Review
Advisory Commission, 27-32 (Todd Olinger ed., October 1997) (Relating how a meeting in 1995 of
conservation groups and tribes to explore potential for cooperation was difficult because culturally their
resource concerns emerge from fundamentally different roots).
96. Adrian N. Hansen, The Endangered Species Act and the Extinction of Reserved Indian Water
Rights on the San Juan River, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 1305 (1995) (Off reservation economic development by
non-Indian caused drastic reductions in native fish population, leading to ESA action that curtailed
Indian reserved water rights). See Carl H. Johnson, Balancing Species Protection with Tribal Sover-
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fishing rights97 and religious expression. 98 After struggling to validate wa-
ter rights and develop water projects, tribes are often in conflict with envi-
ronmental constraints placed on new development, particularly under the
requirements of the Endangered Species Act.99 The historic inability of
Indian tribes to gain access to government subsidies to develop their water
projects and fulfill their water rights'0° has resulted in tribes bearing a dis-
proportionate burden to conserve endangered fish species under ESA.I°I In
particular, the prohibition of federal actions likely to jeopardize species
under Section 7 of the ESA has prevented some tribal water projects."°2
This is ironic since non-Indian development projects were in large part re-
sponsible for "past and continuing degradation of the environment,"'' 0 3 in-
cluding the decline in fish species. While the United States is obligated to
eignty: What Does the Tribal rights-endangered Species Order Accomplish? 83 Minn. L. Rev. 523, 525
(Dec. 1998).
97. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minn., 124 F.3d 904 (8" Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 118
S. Ct. 2295 (1998) (State of Minnesota sought to enjoin Chippewa tribes from exercising their treaty
fishing rights despite their conservation plan to mitigate the potential for overfishing). See Johnson,
supra n. 97, at 525.
98. U.S. v. Lundquist, 932 F. Supp. 1237 (D. Or 1996) (upholding the conviction of an Indian
under the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act for possessing eagle parts , reasoning that it did not
violate his religious or privacy rights). See Johnson, supra n. 97, at 525.
99. See Holt, supra n. 10, at 163. Sandi B. Zellmer, Indian Lands as Critical Habitat for Indian
Nations and Endangered Species: Tribal Survival and Sovereignty Come First, 43 S.D. L. Rev. 381, 417
(1998) (arguing that the ESA's provisions for the protection of habitat, viewed through the lens of tribal
self-determination, interferes with tribal sovereignty and bears little relation to tribal ecological norms
and values). Steven K. Albert, American Indian Perspectives on the Endangered Species Act, 9 Buff.
Envtl. L.J. 175, 184-86 (Spring 2002) (arguing that ESA implementation that causes Tribes to be pre-
cluded from exercising their reserved water rights is unfair). See generally Jennifer M. Regis-Civetta,
The Effect of the Endangered Species Act on Tribal Economic Development in Indian Country, 50
Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 303 (Fall 1996) (discussing the effect of indirect takings of endangered
species on Indian reservations, and the extent to which the ESA takings provision limits economic
development in Indian Country).
100. See Brian A. Schmidt, Reconciling Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act with Native Ameri-
can Reserved Water Rights, 18 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 109, 120 (Jan. 1999) (The history of federal investment
in water projects demonstrates that the percentage of overall funding that went to Native American
projects averaged 25 percent between 1920-30 and then decreased to less than 2 percent of all projects
by the 1960s-1970s). See Michael R. Moore, Native American Water Rights: Efficiency and Fairness,
29 Nat. Resources J. 763, 773 (1989). Also, see generally, Sandi B. Zellmer, Indian Lands as Critical
Habitat for Indian Nations and Endangered Species: Tribal Survival and Sovereignty Come First, 43
S.D. L. Rev. 381 (1998).
101. See generally Zellmer, supra n. 100 (discussing how Section 7 of the ESA may impair the use
of Native American water rights and in particular how the incremental mortality approach of Section 7
disproportionately affects Native American water development and how this has damaged the water
rights of the Southern Ute, Ute Mountain Ute and the Navajo).
102. In practice, the federal government funds water development on tribal reservations, and even if
the federal government did not fund a particular project, the project would probably require a Clean
Water Act, Section 404 permit to dredge and fill a waterway. 33 U.S.C. 1344 (1994). See Schmidt,
supra n. 101, at 116-21.
103. Lionel Boyer, Comments in Tribal Workshop on the Endangered Species Act, Seattle, Wash.
(Feb 1-2, 1996). See Charles Wilkinson, Symposium: Indian Law into the Twenty-First Century: The
Role of Bilateralism in Fulfilling the Federal-Tribal Relationship: The Tribal Rights-Endangered Spe-
cies Secretarial Order, 72 Wash. L. Rev. 1063, 1065 (October 1997) (discussing "the process that led
up to the issuance of the Order and the extent to which the development and content of the Order fulfills
the promise of a serious, bilateral relationship between the federal and tribal governments.").
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protect the survival and recovery of listed species under ESA, it is also ob-
ligated to Indian tribes under its treaty and trust obligations.1t 4 However, if
the goal of ESA to conserve species and ecosystems is shared by all af-
fected parties, including tribes, environmental groups, the federal and state
governments, and non-Indian resource users, the economic burden could be
more equitably apportioned.05
B. The Secretarial Order on American Indian Tribal Rights, Federal-
Tribal Trust Responsibilities, and the Endangered Species Act
To resolve some of these issues, an initial workshop was held in 1996,
followed by a series of meetings to examine how tribes could look beyond
the ESA to accomplish their long-term objectives.' °6  In particular, the
tribes emphasized an issue that resonates with environmental groups - that
ecosystem management approaches move beyond the species-by-species
last ditch focus of the ESA and address both the causes for species decline
and the sustainability of cultures and economies. The tribes believe such
approaches should build on principles such as holistic management, sus-
tainability, continuity of culture, and stewardship, among others.107
The outcome of this workshop and the additional meetings was a June 5,
1997 jointly-released Secretarial Order signed by Secretary of the Interior
Bruce Babbitt and Secretary of Commerce, William Daley entitled "Ameri-
can Indian Tribal Rights, Federal-Tribal Trust Responsibilities, and the
Endangered Species Act"10 8 to address the conflicts described above. The
Order attempted to harmonize both Indian law and the ESA, and set out five
principles, including that federal departments work directly with Indian
tribes on a government-to-government basis to assist tribes in developing
and expanding tribal programs to promote healthy ecosystems while being
sensitive to Indian culture, religion and spirituality. Federal departments
were to recognize that Indian lands are not subject to the same controls as
public lands, and they were to facilitate the mutual exchange of informa-
104. The United States has a federal trust obligation for Indian tribes, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831), that requires it to protect "to the fullest extent possible" the tribe's treaty rights and
the resources on which those rights depend." Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252,
256 (D.D.C. 1973). This trust responsibility has a procedural component of ensuring that the trustee
consults with its beneficiary to obtain the tribes' own views of their interests, see Presidential Memo-
randum on Government-to-Government Relations with Native American Tribal Governments, 59 Fed.
Reg. 22951 (May 4, 1994), and Exec. Or. No. 13084, 63 Fed. Reg. 27655 (May 14, 1998), and obligates
the U.S. Department of Justice to represent tribes and their interest in court, including rights to the use
of natural resources. 25 U.S.C. § 175. See Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. Escondido Mutual Water
Co., 459 F. 2d 1082 (1972). See Holt, supra n. 100, 155-58.
105. Holt, supra n. 100, at 164-165.
106. Id. at 165
107. Memorandum summarizing the Tribal Workshop on the Endangered Species Act (Feb. 20,
1996) (cited in Wilkinson, supra n. 104, at 1073-74).
108. Secretarial Order: American Indian Tribal Rights, Federal - Tribal Trust Responsibilities, and
the Endangered species Act (1997). Secretarial Or. No. 3206, (June 5, 1997) (cited in Wilkinson, supra
n. 104, at n. 43).
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tion.1°9  Because the Order promoted increased sharing of information on
issues such as habitat protection for endangered species,' 10 it can potentially
increase communication and a sharing of expertise between Indian tribes




The trend in western water policy today is a movement away from new
water development to a focus on managing water resources to meet com-
petitive demands for water. As already indicated, satisfying the mandate to
protect species and their ecosystems, and the rights of Indian tribes to ac-
cess water and fish, requires a revisiting of past water allocation and man-
agement practices. This has primarily occurred in the courts, but litigation
presents significant drawbacks.
Water conflicts on many Indian reservations, like litigation under ESA,
often go through an almost endless succession of court cases.'t 2 In the case
of stream adjudications, litigation is also lengthy and expensive and often
results in paper rights to water for tribes and under ESA, without either the
delivery of actual water or the provision of funds for future delivery." 3 In
addition for Indian tribes, the judge is generally limited to addressing the
quantity and priority of a water right without discussion of funding, water
management, water marketing or the development of new water. 14
109. Wilkinson, supra n. 104, at 1082. Charles Wilkinson states that what was most significant
about the Executive Order was the bilateral process through which the tribes and the federal government
negotiated as equals and eventually agreed upon a final document. Set against long and mostly negative
past relations between these two groups, it held out the possibility of a new way of working together to
achieve common goals. The memorandum was significant in finally taking into account the concerns of
the Round Valley Tribes in negotiations between NMFS, FERC and California officials over Potter
Valley Hydropower Project (in Northern California) operations to recover the declining Eel River fish-
ery. Id. at 1077-80. See generally Langridge, supra n. 84.
110. Potential ramifications on the negative side include that the Order was restricted to "Indian
lands" rather than "Indian country," preventing tribes from regulating activities on nonmember fee land
that may adversely affect critical habitat, and having to rely on NMFS and FWS to take action against
non-Indian parties on allotments within reservations who may be violating ESA. See Wilkinson, supra
n. 104, at 1085.
111. Carl H. Johnson, supra n. 99, at 561. Past mistrust between tribes and the federal government
led tribal officials to sometimes withhold information from the FWS regarding listed species on the
reservation. The order encourages mutual cooperation that could support increased information sharing.
In addition, it could set a standard for a more appropriate model of sovereign-sovereign relationships. Id.
112. McCool, supra n. 24, at 181-82. (The water rights for the Pyramid Lake tribe, for example,
have been in court off and on since 1913).
113. Royster, supra n. 25, at 100.
114. Austin Nunez and Mary G. Wallace, Solutions or Symbols? An Indian Perspective on Water
Settlements, in Indian Water in the New West, 37 (Thomas R. McGuire et al. eds., U. of Ariz. Press
1993). Negotiated settlements can be pragmatic alternatives to litigation. However, a tribe might find
itself in a weak bargaining position in negotiations if a court has not yet determined a tribe's water
quantity and priority dates. Royster suggests that it may be in a tribe's best interest to litigate certain
basic reserved rights issues prior to negotiating settlements. See Royster, supra n. 25, at 100-01. Peter
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Negotiated water settlements can potentially address the broader goals of
both tribes and environmental groups for habitat protection, and provide for
the needs of all communities for housing, farming and manufacturing.
11 5
Their advantages include flexibility to accommodate local needs and poten-
tially a less expensive and faster resolution of difficult issues. While tribes
might have to relinquish some legal rights, they could finally receive actual
"wet" water and generate a stronger ability to bargain for aspects of re-
served rights that have not yet been resolved by the courts, such as access to
groundwater, change of water use and off-reservation water marketing. 16
Where ESA and tribal rights are involved with other parties in a highly
politicized conflict, there can be significant advantages to utilizing a court
supervised negotiated remedy. The court can set clear recovery levels and
mile-posts for projected tasks and maintain continuing jurisdiction over the
remedy making sure it is enforced. In addition, other groups and agencies
can be brought into the process. 117 For example, in planning for the recov-
ery of the Columbia River salmon, the Northwest Power Planning Council
had a statutorily defined role under the Federal Northwest Power Act."
1 8
However, the treaty tribes and states also had a role in that the Council's
plan for recovering the salmon was required to take into account their rec-
ommendations. This included a detailed recovery plan for the Columbia
River Basin developed by the Columbia River tribes that addressed day-to-
day operation of the hydro-system and reflected a clear expression of the
level of protection needed to restore their fisheries to harvest levels."19
In the Truckee-Carson Basins in western Nevada, urban users joined
forces with Indian tribes and environmental interests seeking to restore the
Sly also notes that "the weakness of the negotiation process is its lack of structure, which can consume
time and effort at high cost without measurable results." Reserved Water Rights Settlement Manual, 39
(Island Press 1988).
115. See Joseph Sax, supra n. 87, at 2378-79
116. Gina McGovern, Settlement or Adjudication: Resolving Indian Reserved Rights, 36 Ariz. L.
Rev. 195, 197-98 (Spring 1994). States also gain the certainty of resolving water rights claims. Since the
1970s, settlements of Indian rights to water have increased, and they have the potential to become the
preferred method of both resolving complex issues and increasing the likelihood of tribe's actually
obtaining in-stream flows to sustain fisheries See Royster, supra n. 25, at 100-01. Settlements also
dramatically increased spending on Indian water and related programs, a dramatic change from the past.
See Daniel McCool, Native Waters: Contemporary Indian Water Settlements and the Second Treaty
Era, 54 (U. of Ariz. Press 2002).
117. See Mary Christina Wood, Reclaiming the Natural Rivers: The Endangered Species Act as
Applied to Endangered River Ecosystems, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 197, 283-84 (Spring 1998).
118. Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839 et seq.
(1994 and Supp. 1 1995). Passed by Congress in 1980, the Act created the Northwest Power Planning
Council consisting of state-appointed representatives from the Columbia River Basin states. Id. at §
839(a)(1) - (2). The Council was charged with developing hydropower and providing for the recovery
of the fish. Id. (discussed in Wood, supra n. 118, at 222-23).
119. Wy-Kan-Ush-M Wa-Kish-Wit (Spirit of the Salmon): The Columbia River Anadromous Fish
Restoration Plan of the Nez Perce, Umatilla, Warm Springs and Yakima Tribes (1996) (cited in Wood,
supra n. 118, at 226). The plan addresses the entire life cycle of the salmon from inception, when eggs
are deposited in graveled spawning beds, to the end when adults return to their natal waters to spawn
and then die.
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degraded aquatic ecosystems. They competed with the established alloca-
tions of long term irrigators. The listing of the cui-ui and Lahontan cut-
throat trout under the ESA and the emergence of two long subordinated
Indian claims for water to support their traditional fishery and to irrigate
crop lands, exposed the need for new water allocation patterns and govern-
ance instituted on a basin wide scale. 20  The initial defeat of the tribes,
where they claimed reserved rights in attempting to gain sufficient water to
support the fishery, led them to turn to the ESA as a second strategy. 121
Working with other environmental groups, they were successful in gaining
control over a major source of unallocated water to use as a drought re-
serve, 22 which in turn created incentives for urban interests to push for a
more comprehensive basin-wide settlement that emphasized more sustain-
able use and management that would conserve habitat. 23 Finally, in 1990,
Congress intervened to create a process to develop a physical solution with
the Truckee-Carson - Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement Act that re-
solved disputes between both California and Nevada and settled allocations
between the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe and urban water users. The legisla-
tion resulted in the negotiation of the Truckee River Operating Agreement
(TROA), that combined more efficient operations of existing reservoirs to
both provide drought insurance for the Reno - Sparks area and improve
spawning flows for the Pyramid Lake fishery.
124
Successful settlements often involve a long-term process characterized
by (a) initial litigation as a catalyst for negotiation, 25 (b) prolonged litiga-
tions, and (c) a litigation strategy aimed at winning recognition of the
power of one or more parties. 26 For example, this can occur where litiga-
tion involves tribal and/ ESA claims for habitat protection,127 and where the
two groups strategize together to achieve common goals. Dan Tarlock
points to strategies that can create new solutions for and the institutions for
administration of basins and watersheds with a focus on more limited (but
better quality) participation by involved parties. 128 Tarlock suggests that
federal threats to reallocate water can often induce all parties involved in a
water conflict to seek alternatives to gridlock such as negotiated settle-
120. A. Dan Tarlock, The Creation of New Risk Sharing Water Entitlement Regimes: The Case of
the Truckee-Carson Settlement in Symposium, Case Study on Regulatory Integration: Water Policy and
the Protection of Endangered Species in the Truckee-Carson River Basin, 25 Ecol. L.Q. 674, 678
(1999).
121. Id. at 679.
122. Id. (Stampede Reservoir on the Truckee River).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 684.
125. William H. Swan, The Salt River Pima-Maricopa Settlement: An Overview, in Indian Water in
the New West, 119 (Thomas R. McGuire et al. eds., U. of Ariz. Press 1993).
126. McCool, supra n. 117 at 54-55.
127. The formation of CALFED is a good example.
128. Tarlock, supra n. 124, 676, n. 6 (citing Jim Rossi , Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass
Participation for Deliberative Agency Decision-Making, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 173 (Fall 1997)).
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ments. 129  Examples include the California Bay Delta and the Orange
County Multi-Species Habitat Conservation Plan, where the threat of fed-
eral clout was a driving factor behind legal and institutional innovation.1
30
Tarlock also suggests that when several necessary conditions occur, there is
a greater likelihood of successful basin-level solutions. These include (1)
incentives by the federal government to induce all parties to consider real-
location possibilities, (2) large blocks of water held by institutional parties
that have the capacity to bear risk, (3) actual or threatened legal or political




While the Bureau of Reclamation was supporting water development
throughout the west, tribes were mostly denied the benefits of these pro-
grams. With few exceptions, projects were built by the federal government
without any attempt to define or protect the prior rights of Indian tribes to
the waters utilized for these projects. In addition, their environmental im-
pacts were not considered throughout most of the twentieth century.
Since the latter part of the twentieth century, despite a significant push
for habitat protection by Indian tribes and environmental groups, courts
have been inconsistent in supporting both a tribal right to habitat protection
and a requirement for habitat protection under ESA, and both groups con-
tinue to face declining wildlife populations. Stronger coalitions can clearly
strengthen efforts to achieve greater habitat protection, such as through
major changes in re-operating or significantly re-tooling existing irrigation
and hydropower facilities to increase the timing and amount of in-stream
flows for fish.
Social movement theorists have pointed to how success by less powerful
groups in altering particular policies is related to internal characteristics,
such as the ability of these groups to form successful coalitions.132 Ac-
knowledging that the trend today is towards negotiated settlements, devel-
oping strong coalitions between these two communities will encourage the
sharing of local knowledge and expertise and support the achievement of a
common goal, the right to habitat protection for rivers, their fisheries and
the communities that rely on these resources for sustenance.
129. Id. at 677
130. Id. at 683 (referencing Elizabeth A. Reike, The Bay Delta Accord: A Stride Toward Sustain-
ability, 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 341 (1996), and John Weiner, Natural Communities Conservation Planning:
An Ecosystem Approach to Protecting Endangered Species, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 319 (Jan. 1995)).
131. Tarlock, supra n. 121, at681-82.
132. See, for example, Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious
Politics (Press Syndicate U. of Cambridge 1998), and Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow & Charles Tilly,
The Dynamics of Contention (Press Syndicate U. of Cambridge 2001) (these theorists discuss how
political opportunities for successful action include the potential for political alignments and coalitions).
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